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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Delays in Coordination and Lack of Cooperation  
 (CIA and the IAC Agencies)

INTRODUCTION

1. When CIA was established by the National Security Act of 1947 (September 1947) no reference was made to the Intelligence Advisory Board which had been functioning as an advisory board to the Director of CIG under the former NIA. Both the CIG and the IAB were established in the Presidential Letter of 22 January 1946.

2. Section 303 of the 1947 Act gave the DCI the authority to appoint advisory committees, etc., but the intelligence chiefs of the Services said they could not accept such an appointment from the DCI but only from the NSC.

3. Accordingly, as a result of a paper concurred in by all IAC members, on 12 December 1947 the NSC in NSCID No. 1 established the IAC and provided that recommendations to the NSC from the DCI should receive the concurrence of the IAC members before submission to the NSC. Of course, the goal sought is unanimity among the IAC agencies and this commendable aim has brought endless delays, modifications of verbiage, and watered-down versions of the presentation because of the unhealthy competitive and suspicious attitudes adopted by the IAC. The avoidance of sending split papers to the NSC has been over-emphasized. There has been continuous compromise and rewriting of proposals, so that all IAC members would agree to the recommendations to the NSC. This led to emasculated directives with many "loop holes" (enclosure A gives examples) and entailed rewriting of the old directives under the new Act by the new "Standing Committee" in October 1947-January 1948, largely because the CIA proposals of September 1947 prepared in the Agency were not acceptable to the IAC members. Even when written by the "Standing Committee" of the IAC there were great delays in getting final approval from the IAC members.

4. Unanimous concurrence was considered desirable; differences among the Military Services were to be resolved by the Secretary of Defense.

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NSCID #2 ABOUT COLLECTION

1. Was a rewrite, under the new Act, of a former NIA directive of a similar nature on the same subject. After being drafted by the new Standing Committee and receiving its approval in December 1947 it went to the IAC members.

2. The Air Force had been established as an independent agency since the original collection directives had been written. Hence they were very much concerned about the function of collection of aeronautical data. This brought conflict with the Naval Air Arm so the problem had been referred to the Secretary of Defense for solution.

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3. When the Navy member had not replied to the subsequent implementing DCI directive of January 1948 replacing the former CIG directive ☐ by June 7, 1948, after repeated oral requests, this matter was referred to the Secretary of Defense again on June 7th and followed up by repeated oral requests. The Navy's approval was finally received by CIA on 8 October 1948 to make the agreement on DCI 2/1 unanimous, almost ten months after the "agreed" proposal had left CIA.

MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE

1. On 10 February 1949 the Secretary of Defense requested CIA to give consideration to Medical Intelligence which had already been under study in the Pentagon and in CIA since October 1947. Preliminary discussions were held and this was on the agenda for the regular March meeting of the IAC. There have been numerous subsequent meetings, but still no agreement has been reached.

2. The Army wishes to have Medical Intelligence handled as a subcommittee under the general subject of Scientific Intelligence. This matter was initiated in March 1949 and discussed subsequently. An agreed Standing Committee proposal was circulated on 15 July 1949, and rewritten from the suggestions received from the IAC members and recirculated on 22 August 1949. The Army member of the IAC has not yet agreed, and it is understood that this proposed directive is being rewritten again by the Army.

3. Entailed in this delay over Scientific Intelligence is the work requested of CIA by the Research and Development Board to support its Warner Plan. CIA desires to support the RDB but cannot do so unless all the Services actively support CIA and supply pertinent data.

"FREE FLOW" OF INFORMATION

1. A cardinal principle of CIA and the IAC agencies has been the "free flow" of pertinent data (paragraphs 8 and 9 of NSCID No. 1), but even now there are difficulties and delays in getting necessary information from the participating IAC agencies.

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2. The Army distributes its incoming messages to three centers, only one of which is ID. It is believed that new regulations were recently issued with a view towards improving this situation, but it is not yet known how effective they are.

3. The State Department, also, does not distribute everything within State to its "R" area, with whom we have to deal as State's IAC member. Two examples are the White Paper on China and the recent British-American Financial Talks.

4. In the first case CIA requested of State 30 copies of the China White Paper about a month before it was published. No draft was supplied, nor was a copy of the final paper sent in advance by State. The supply from the Printer was received by State 3-4 days before it was released to the public and it was given to the press the day before its public release. Only three days after public release did ORE receive a copy from State and other copies in small lots during the following 2-3 weeks. In the meantime, CIA had bought its first 2-3 copies from the Government Printing Office the first day it was publicly released.

5. Similarly with the Pound Sterling talks, technical and other data were requested of Undersecretary Webb (7 September 1949). Special Assistant Armstrong replied (20 September 1949) that regrettably there were no minutes of the meetings and the agenda had already been supplied CIA. CIA has now ascertained that there are several thick volumes of Technical Committee papers which other agencies of the Government have. These were not supplied to CIA by State.

#### VARIOUS DELAYS

1. Various subjects of mutual interest have been brought up during the past three years, but usually no expeditious agreements or action can be taken thereon. The "Exploitation of the Foreign Press" was first considered in October 1946, but took a year to be implemented. "Scientific Attaches" were first considered in 1946 or 1947. An NSCID was finally issued on 18 January 1949, yet it is believed that there are none in the field yet. The "Exploitation of Foreign Nationals" was proposed in January 1947, yet no directive has yet been agreed upon. The "MIS Program" was given consideration in December 1946, but not implemented under an agreement until December 1948, and even now is greatly behind the agreed upon schedule.

#### RESUME

1. There is no recognition by the IAC agencies that National Intelligence production may and does necessarily infringe on the fields of activity of the agencies. Furthermore, they never accept the viewpoint that their views may be biased by Departmental policy. Recent decisions

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in State to superimpose political desk visa over intelligence conclusions will probably not alter in one iota this situation. Largely because of this attitude, they contest every step taken by CIA to strengthen and coordinate intelligence. Such a myopic concept hinders the "forthright leadership" called for in the Dulles Report.

2. Never to our knowledge have the agencies (IAC) recognized that in the production of National Intelligence CIA is the staff operating organization for the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs and any other policy level requesting intelligence estimates from CIA. Without a willingness to so recognize our clear-cut and inevitable function, the agencies demand that all requests should, in the first instance, go to them for consideration and (though they don't mention it) fall into the departmental priority schedule. This attitude brings about much unhealthy bickering and unnecessary rivalry, and prevents progress in attempting to coordinate intelligence.

3. After all, we are all working for the one government so should put its total interests first.

PRESCOTT CHILDS  
Chief, ICAPS

Enclosure

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